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Evolutionary approaches to behavior, so far from indicating that human 
behavioral patterns must be universal and '%ired," actually provide us with 
good reasons for expecting cultural diversity and good tools for showing how 
it might develop. Even gender-role related behavior may be very plastic. Highly 
"macho" male behavior may be an adaptation to dangerous ecological and 
economic constraints. Similarly, homicide rates differ massively from culture 
to culture and may be under the control of specifiable ecological and econom& 
constraints. 
Recently a new field calling itself "evolutionary psychology" has become 
prominent on the scientific stage. The concerns and approaches of this field 
are continuous with predecessor fields such as ethology and sociobiology 
and to a lesser extent population genetics and behavioral genetics. The field 
is concerned with the adaptive problems that humans faced over the course 
of evolution, and with the behavioral mechanisms that evolved in response 
to selection pressures. Some examples include work on criteria of mate 
selection by David Buss (1989), work on postulated cognitive mechanisms 
for solving characteristic social and economic problems (for example, 
Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, in press), work positing the fitness advantages 
of anxiety (Buss, 1990) and work positing the fitness advantages of an un- 
conscious mind (Nesse, 1990). The characteristic argument of this discipline 
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is a materialistic or functional one. It considers that the ecology or economy 
or characteristic patterns of social relations would have made certain be- 
haviors useful, and that there may be evidence that these behaviors are 
prewired or at least "prepared" in the sense that people are likely to emit 
them, given certain conditions, because of biological mechanisms that un- 
derlie them. Or the argument begins in the opposite direction with appar- 
ently endemic or striking behavior patterns and a search is made for a 
materialistic or functional argument to elucidate the behavior. The assump- 
tion is that a biological or "prewired" mechanism underlies the behavior 
pattern. 
Whenever a new field shows as much vigor and enthusiasm as evo- 
lutionary psychology does, its neighbors are likely to get nervous. And I 
do think social psychologists are nervous in various ways about evolutionary 
psychology and other biological approaches to behavior. There are three 
sources of concern that I have spotted. The first is that very broad claims 
are often made on the basis of little that most social psychologists would 
regard as evidence. The second is plain old-fashioned turf protection. Evo- 
lutionary psychologists seem to be mowing much of the same grass that 
social psychologists have long regarded as their own, and the question natu- 
rally arises as to who is going to own the intellectual territory here. The 
third concern is about values. Outsiders often think that evolutionary psy- 
chologists believe that certain behavior patterns are fixed or hard-wired. 
Social psychologists like to believe in flexibility in general, and they cer- 
tainly don't want to believe in fixedness of the kind of behaviors that evo- 
lutionary psychologists discuss most frequently, such as aggression and 
behavior related to gender roles. 
I would like to take up each of these points in turn. In a word, I 
want to argue that each of these concerns has been exaggerated, and that 
evolutionary psychology and biological perspectives on behavioral science 
in general offer social psychologists valuable tools, and (even though my 
chauvinism makes me hesitate to say it) theoretical guidance for studying 
some problems of great interest to us. 
First, and most briefly, I will say that I share the impatience of many 
social psychologists with the scientific standards characteristic of many evo- 
lutionary psychology pronouncements. Sometimes the argument form can 
be little more, at base, than "I now assert the following bold proposition 
p." Even where there is evidence, the arguments based on it can be ex- 
traordinarily thin. My own pet peeve is against studies that show that peo- 
ple handle problem A somewhat better than problem B and then assert 
that there must be privileged wiring for solving A. Nothing short of massive 
differences, such as are found for the leaning of stimulus associations that 
are differently "prepared" (Seligman, 1970), could create a presumption of 
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prewiring, in my view. But I think we should resist the annoyance produced 
by this sort of thing. A field deserves to be judged by its best achievements, 
and I think there are already several important ones by people working on 
evolutionary approaches to behavior, who include (in addition to psycholo- 
gists) biologists, anthropologists, economists, and political scientists. 
Second, there is the question of turf. In one way or another, this has 
been addressed by all of the contributors to this symposium. All seem ba- 
sically agreed that the playing field in question is quite big enough for all 
contenders and that the two disciplines can make good use of each other. 
Cantor notes the heuristic value of evolutionary theory for social psychology 
and points out that an emphasis on the importance of social relations is 
at the very core of the perspective and therefore holds that ,'the evolution- 
ary account can be a useful guide to important domains of human inter- 
action" (Cantor, this issue, p. 248). Buss goes further and invites social 
psychologists to come and take their rightful place in the vanguard of evo- 
lutionary psychology (Buss, this issue). The rationale for this is that many 
of the most important adaptive problems were social in nature. Conse- 
quently, solutions to these problems were driving human evolution to a 
substantial degree. Thus the insights of social psychologists into the nature 
of the most fundamental social problems will translate into insights about 
the evolution of behavioral mechanisms. Brewer and Caporael (this issue) 
seem ready to take Buss up on his invitation. They apply insights from 
social psychology about the nature of group life and the relation of the 
individual to the group to an account of selection that implies that a form 
of group selection may actually have played a role in human evolution. I 
only wish to add my voice to this chorus. The two fields have a great deal 
to say to one another, and so far from feeling threatened by the emergence 
of evolutionary psychology, social psychologists should perceive it as an ex- 
cellent opportunity to ply their trade with new tools, in company with peo- 
ple with a set of concerns that is similar enough to be congenial and a 
perspective that is novel enough to be stimulating. 
The third frequently expressed concern of social psychologists is with 
the value implications of evolutionary approaches. As Cantor notes in this 
issue, it is easy to slide from a depiction of a type of behavior as having 
evolved to an assumption that it is "prewired" and inevitable and from 
there to a resigned acceptance that the behavior is the appropriate one for 
humans. I want to identify myself with many of the reservations that Cantor 
urges in her paper, and I want to spend most of the rest of my paper 
arguing that we may actually have less to fear about prewiring and fixedness 
from evolutionary psychology, and from population and behavioral genetics, 
than many have supposed. I want to deal with aspects of two topics - -  sex 
258 Nisbett 
and aggression - -  that are very important for evolutionary psychologists be- 
cause of their central role in fitness concerns. 
Of all the theoretical notions stemming from evolutionary approaches 
to behavior, none seems so far-reaching to me as the concept of "parental 
investment." This concept accounts in a compelling way for differences in 
behavior across species and for sex differences in behavior within species 
(see, e.g., Buss, 1989). Fish have hundreds of thousands of fertilized eggs 
in a lifetime and pay not the slightest attention to their offspring. Bears 
have only a few offspring and the female bear is devoted to each of them 
for the first few years after they are born. Male bears are required only 
for insemination and have nothing to do with their offspring. Though hu- 
man males are in general far more involved with the raising of their off- 
spring than bears or most of our primate relatives, human males and 
females nevertheless have different degrees of parental investment. It is 
technically possible for male humans to act like male bears and have their 
genes perpetuated. Indeed, some male humans do just that. There are 
many implications of the notion of parental investment for gender differ- 
ences: Female humans could be expected to be more nurturant, more in- 
terested in children and perhaps more interested in people in general, more 
selective of whom to mate with, and so on across a wide variety of traits 
that stereotypically differ across gender. 
The parental investment notion thus could be seen to dictate rela- 
tively fixed gender roles. But in fact we already know from anthropological 
work completed early in this century that gender roles differ quite dramati- 
cally from one culture to another. This conclusion is associated with Mar- 
garet Mead's name more than with any other. Her descriptions of the 
societies that gave rise to her views have been sharply questioned in the 
recent anthropological literature, so it is important to note that the gen- 
eralizations about extreme variability in gender role - -  from marked stereo- 
typic male and female  pa t te rns  to extremely muted,  even qui te  
difficult-to-detect gender d i f fe rences -  do not depend in any way on her 
work. The range has been documented repeatedly by other researchers 
(Gilmore, 1990). 
But what are we to make of this diversity of gender-role patterns? 
Not that there are no biological constraints. As Buss notes in this issue, 
diversity does not indicate that biology makes no critical contribution. The 
diversity may reflect the fact that different circumstances trigger different 
behavioral forms, each of which is biologically prepared in some important 
sense. 
Thus the diversity itself may be well understood in essentially evolu- 
tionary terms, which is the main point I wish to make about the utility of 
evolutionary psychology for social psychology. The way we understand the 
Evolutionary Psychology, Biology, and Cultural Evolution 259 
forces that shape human biology over the long haul may be useful for the 
way we understand the forces that push groups toward one or another be- 
havior pattern over the short h a u l -  a process that might be called "cul- 
tural evolution." In other words, the same material circumstances that gave 
rise to particular behavioral preparedness over the course of biological evo- 
lution may serve to prompt the emergence of these behavioral patterns in 
particular groups. This point is made in a concrete way in a fascinating 
book by David Gilmore entitled Manhood in the Making (1990). Gilmore 
begins his book by noting that the extreme masculine role variant we call 
mach i smo-  the pattern of pride in sexual prowess, productivity in male- 
only economic roles, and physical courage - -  is manifested by scores of cul- 
tures the world over. And yet, as we have just been noting, this pattern is 
by no means universal. Why do some cultures have it and others not? 
Gilmore's (1990) answer is that the macho pattern is an adaptation 
to conditions of extreme risk associated with the means of production by 
males. A pattern of risk and high mortality characterize many economic 
systems. It is inherent, for example, in most systems that depend on herding 
animals. The neighbors are always going to find it tempting to steal the 
herd, and so a willingness to risk death to prevent such an occurrence can 
be an economic necessity. Social psychologists know that the sort of com- 
mitment to one's work is likely to be associated with valuing it highly, and 
hence the pride in productivity characteristic of people with risky occupa- 
tions. Moreover, the high mortality rate associated with such systems puts 
a particularly high premium on the male pattern of sowing one's oats as 
opposed to (or perhaps in addition to) merely nurturing one small brood 
of offspring. Consistent with Gilmore's hypothesis, it has been noted that 
the Plains Indians of North America shifted their gender-role patterns with 
the coming of the horse (Lowie, 1954). Wealth now depended on the num- 
ber of horses owned by an individual man and by a tribe. The tribes that 
used horses in their economies, like the Cheyenne and the Sioux, developed 
a new culture of militarism and glorification of physical valor that made 
them increasingly distinct from non-Plains people such as the Navajo, Hopi, 
and Iroqouis. 
Gilmore's most persuasive evidence concerns the dramatic difference 
between two islands in the South P a c i f i c -  Truk and Tahiti. Both are the 
very image of the topical paradise, but they could not be more different 
with respect to gender roles. The male Trukese are violent fighters and 
compete with one another in physical contests and other acts of bravado 
(Marshall, 1979). They are expected to have many love affairs and they 
begin to sire children early. They are proud of their material possessions 
and compete with one another in building up a store of them. Women are 
required to be utterly submissive, and the men are extremely protective of 
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them. Visitors to the island approach the women at their extreme peril. In 
contrast, Tahitian women, from their first encounter with Westerners, en- 
gaged in sexual activity with them with the full knowledge of the male popu- 
lation of the island. The males are little interested in material pursuits and 
do not compete with one another in them (Levy, 1973). Men are expected 
to be passive and submissive, and to ignore slights. There is no requirement 
to defend honor. 
How to account for these differences? Gilmore (1990) does so by 
pointing to a dramatic difference in the means of obtaining food in the 
two cultures. The Tahitians fish in a lagoon at no risk to themselves and 
food is quite plentiful. The Trukese must obtain their fish on the open sea. 
When a Trukese male leaves for a day of fishing, there is a genuine pos- 
sibility he will not return. Thus the fearless, aggressive macho style is an 
adaptation to danger. Males are taught to fear unmanliness more than 
death because this is the only way to encourage men to produce when 
there is great danger. Thus a muting of gender differences and surcease 
from the crushing requirements of assertive masculinity are a privilege of 
those societies that can put food on their tables without great risk. 
Marvin Harris (1980) has proposed that a similar distinction may ap- 
ply among hunter-gatherers. Where game is scarce, warfare may be com- 
mon and sexual dimorphism in behavior relatively great. Aggressiveness 
against competitors in the search for large game, for example, may be rela- 
tively advantageous under scarcity. Thus scarcity may prompt the macho 
adaptation among males. Where there is abundance, male aggressiveness 
may be reduced and behavioral dimorphism may be less. 
Thus an evolutionary approach, so far from requiring that important 
human behavior patterns be invariant, helps us to explain why the various 
diverse gender-related patterns of behavior are found where they are. It 
becomes a cultural evolution approach when it explains not the biologically 
based propensities but the circumstances that elicit those propensities that 
are part of the equipment of every human. 
A concrete example of a cultural evolution account that is aided, in- 
deed compelled, by biological considerations from both an evolutionary 
standpoint and a genetic standpoint comes from the study of cultural dif- 
ferences in homicide. Pop-psych (or rather pop-anthro) books of the 1960s 
with a biological orientation led many people to believe human nature was 
bred in tooth and claw and that violence might be endemic to the (male) 
human constitution. Once again, such a simplistic view flies in the face of 
human cultural variability. Here we are able to supply numbers having rea- 
sonably good accuracy in relation to the variation that exists worldwide. 
Cultures actually differ in their homicide rates by a factor of hundreds 
(Daly & Wilson, 1988; Wolfgang & Ferracuti (1967/1982)! The rates of 
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homicide are low enough in some cultures, for example in Iceland and 
Israel, as to constitute great aberrations of extreme rarity. In others, for 
example, modern American inner cities, the rates are hundreds of times 
higher, and homicide is literally an everyday occurrence. 
Again, how to account for such differences? Some people might be 
inclined to look to biological variability among human groups to account 
for the difference. But the biological evidence, and the evolutionary argu- 
ments, are quite opposed to such an account. Only 7 percent of human 
genetic variation is between race, while 85 percent of it is within the local 
group, with the remainder being variation between tribes or nations within 
a race (Lewontin, 1982). That is, there is substantially more variability be- 
tween two individuals chosen at random from within a racial group than 
there is between the means of the two racial groups overall. Thus, the av- 
erage genetic difference between two Icelandic villagers or between two 
black Detroiters is considerably greater than the mean difference between 
Iceland and the black population of Detroit. And though there is evidence 
for heritability of criminality of some kinds within European groups, the 
same evidence base suggests no heritability for homicide (see Wilson & 
Herrnstein, 1985, for a review). Finally, the same genetic populations show 
dramatically different rates of homicide in different circumstances. Homi- 
cide rates in West Africa are not very high on a worldwide scale even 
though homicide rates of Americans of West African descent are among 
the highest in the world (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967/1982). Similarly, the 
rates for Europeans are generally very low on a worldwide scale, but are 
quite high in North America. Evolutionary considerations establish that the 
time scale of West African and European presence in the New World is 
vastly too short to have produced other than trivial biological differences 
from the parent populations. 
Thus genetic and evolutionary arguments compel an account of homi- 
cide rate differences in nonbiological terms. My colleagues and I have be- 
gun to look at candidates for explaining differences in homicide rates 
(Nisbett, Polly, & Lang, 1991). We have focused on the differences in homi- 
cide rates between the southern and northern regions of the United States. 
The rates have long been presumed to be due to a southern culture of 
violence, and we believe we have excellent evidence to support the con- 
tention that it is such a cultural difference rather than ecological or eco- 
nomic ones that produce the regional differences. We examined two 
different areas of the Great Plains having very similar ecologies, economies, 
and ethnic stock, having been settled primarily by English, Irish, and Ger- 
mans. These regions are the Texas panhandle and the state of Nebraska. 
The major obvious difference between the regions is that the Europeans 
who settled the Texas panhandle came from the Upper South for the most 
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part, while those who settled Nebraska came from the East, from other 
parts of the Midwest, and directly from Europe. Homicide rates are four 
times as high in the Texas panhandle as in Nebraska. 
We are now beginning to explore whether these homicide rate dif- 
ferences have changed much over the past few generations. Whichever way 
it turns out, we will have learned something about cultural evolution. If 
the rates are converging, this will support the materialist view that cultures 
change in direct response to ecological and economic circumstances, which 
do not differ across the regions studied. If they have not changed, this 
would be more consistent with a social constructionist view that cultural 
factors can have substantial autonomy. Whichever result is obtained, how- 
ever, the biological and evolutionary perspectives will have been crucial to 
making the case for a nonbiological, cultural account of some kind. 
Thus I hope I have made my case that social psychologists have a 
great deal to gain by making use of evolutionary psychology and biological 
approaches to the study of behavior. These perspectives are not going to 
put us out of business or suggest severe constraints on human nature of a 
kind that would be repellent to most of us. On the contrary, they are going 
to be our allies in making sense of human uniformity and diversity alike. 
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